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Unclear Hostility: 
Supreme Court Discussions of “Hostility to 
Religion” from Barnette to American Legion 
MARK SATTA† 
ABSTRACT 
Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence for the last eighty 
years, but in all that time the Court has never provided a clear 
explanation of what constitutes “hostility to religion.” This lack of 
explanation has recently become increasingly troubling given the 
significant role that the concept of “hostility to religion” has played 
in several high-profile Supreme Court decisions within the last two 
years, including Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, Trump v. 
Hawaii, and American Legion v. American Humanist Association. 
In this paper, I provide a thorough and detailed history of the 
Court’s appeals to “hostility to religion.” Through the lens of that 
historical examination of the Court’s use of the concept of “hostility 
to religion,” I argue that the Court has come to use “hostility to 
religion” ambiguously to mean both the broad category of anything 
that fails to be neutral toward religion and the narrower category 
of specifically that which exhibits active animosity toward religion. 
I argue that this ambiguity has resulted in confused outcomes and 
may contribute to ratcheting up the culture wars. I further argue 
that the best remedy is for the Court to be clearer and more 
judicious in its appeals to “hostility to religion” going forward. I offer 
four suggestions for how the Court can do so.  
 
† My thanks to Mary Ann Glendon, Joe Singer, Nomi Stolzenberg, Mark Tushnet, 
and the editors of the Buffalo Law Review for their insightful feedback on earlier 
versions of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past eighty years, many of the Supreme Court’s 
most influential cases concerning the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of religion have contained at least one 
statement by a justice expressing the view that something 
was or was not “hostile to religion” (or some variation 
thereof). However, in all of these opinions the justices have 
almost never paused to clarify what they mean by “hostility 
to religion.” As is often the case when a phrase is used 
frequently and reflected upon seldomly, the phrase “hostility 
to religion” (and cognate phrases like “hostile toward 
religion,” “exhibiting religious hostility,” etc.) has meant 
different things when used by different justices.1 But the 
justices have routinely failed to acknowledge or account for 
such discordant uses. As a result, appeals to “hostility to 
religion” based on Supreme Court precedent have become 
overly malleable and easily weaponized for partisan ends. 
This paper seeks to clarify matters by providing (1) a detailed 
history of the Court’s use of phrases like “hostility to 
religion,” (2) a descriptive examination and analysis of the 
ambiguous and inconsistent ways in which the Court has 
used such phrases, and (3) a prescriptive account of what the 
Court ought to do moving forward.  
Historically, claims of hostility to religion have rarely 
been determinative in the outcome of the case. But, in recent 
years, that has changed. Issues over whether law-making or 
law-enforcing behavior exhibits hostility toward religion 
have been determinative in the outcome of several important 
cases. The most recent case where the concept of “hostility to 
religion” clearly determined the outcome was the 2018 case 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In Masterpiece, the 
Court vacated a Colorado Court of Appeals ruling that a 
 
 1. Throughout this paper, I will treat the phrases “hostile to religion,” 
“hostility toward religion,” “religious hostility,” and similar phrases as 
synonymous and interchangeable. 
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baker had violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act by 
refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.2 The 
Court did so on the grounds that adjudicators in Colorado 
had exhibited hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs 
during the appeals process. That baker later sued the state 
of Colorado on the basis that Colorado displayed hostility 
toward his religious beliefs.3 
But the concept of hostility to religion has played a 
significant role in cases even more recent than Masterpiece. 
Had the primary dissent in a second 2018 case, Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), been the majority, charges of 
hostility toward religion would have proved determinative 
for a second time in the Court’s 2018 decisions. In Hawaii, 
while a majority of five upheld President Donald Trump’s 
immigration restrictions placed on several Muslim majority 
countries, the primary dissent, penned by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, expressed the view that these restrictions should 
be struck down on First Amendment grounds due to the 
hostility Trump had displayed toward members of the 
Muslim faith in advocating for his “travel ban” during his 
campaign for president.4 
Most recently, on June 20, 2019, in American Legion v. 
American Humanist Association, the Court’s majority 
appealed to the concept of hostility to religion in ruling that 
the presence of a ninety-year-old World War I memorial in 
the form of a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Maryland 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.5 In determining 
that the cross ought to remain on public land, the majority 
reasoned that taking down monuments with religious 
symbolism “will strike many as aggressively hostile to 
 
 2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1732 (2018). 
 3. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074-WYD-STV, at 
*45–46 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019). 
 4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 5. American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 
(2019). 
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religion.”6 
As the examination of these and other cases will show, 
the Supreme Court has vacillated between two distinct 
meanings of what constitutes “hostility towards religion” in 
its First Amendment jurisprudence. Given the increasing 
significance charges of hostility to religion are playing in the 
outcomes of constitutional cases concerning religion, it is 
important that this ambiguity is identified and that greater 
attention be given to what is meant by “hostility to religion.” 
It is also important to devote more careful reflection on what 
the Court should mean by “hostility toward religion” which 
heretofore has been a largely neglected topic. This paper is 
an attempt to make progress toward these goals. 
This paper has four theses. First, phrases like “hostility 
to religion” have been used ambiguously by the Court. 
Sometimes, by “hostility to religion” the justices mean 
something akin to “disfavor toward religion.” At other times, 
by “hostility to religion” the justices mean something akin to 
“animosity toward religion.” 
Second, and related to the first, due to this ambiguity, 
phrases like “hostility to religion,” when used in legal 
opinions, can neither accurately be described simply as 
technical terms—i.e. as legal terms of art—nor can they 
accurately be described as simply in keeping with the 
ordinary language usage of such phrases. The Court’s 
ambiguous treatment is the root of this state of affairs. 
Sometimes the Court has strayed far from ordinary language 
meaning of “hostility” in the context of religion and treated 
“hostility” akin to a technical term. But at other points 
justices have leaned into the ordinary, everyday meaning of 
“hostility” in claiming that something does or does not 
constitute hostility to religion. 
Third, these ambiguous uses have caused confusion and 
strife; both in the Court’s opinions and in the general public 
 
 6. Id. at 2084–85. 
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consciousness. Fourth and finally, the best way to eliminate 
this confusion is to use the phrase “hostility to religion” only 
when one means “animosity toward religion” and to use other 
phrases like “disfavoring religion” or “inhibiting religion” to 
identify instances where actions or policies may harm or 
marginalize religion, but through a means that contains no 
animosity or spite toward religion. 
The bulk of this paper is devoted to thoroughly covering 
the history of the Supreme Court’s usage of phrases like 
“hostility to religion,” “religious hostility,” and “hostile 
toward religion.” Simultaneous to this presentation of the 
history, I will also be making my case that the Court’s 
appeals to “hostility toward religion” have been ambiguous. 
I argue that this ambiguity has been harmful because (1) it 
has muddied Supreme Court religious freedom 
jurisprudence, and (2) it has helped foment the culture wars 
over the role of religion in the United States. I close by 
offering four proposals for how to talk about hostility to 
religion going forward that will help make the Court’s 
jurisprudence clearer, more accurate, and more effective, 
which might ultimately help ratchet down the culture wars 
concerning religion’s role in America. 
In this paper, I make claims about how the Court’s use 
of phrases like “hostility toward religion” do or do not reflect 
ordinary language usage of the word “hostility.” Thus, I 
should say something about what I take the ordinary 
meaning of the word “hostility” to be. I take it that the word 
“hostility,” as used in everyday English, conveys a strong 
negative attitude toward the object one is hostile toward. 
Being hostile isn’t the sort of thing one can be casually. 
Rather, hostility requires a strong commitment and 
emotional opposition to the object of one’s hostility. 
This understanding aligns with how lexicographers 
define the words “hostile” and “hostility.” For example, the 
first lexeme provided for the word “hostile” in the Oxford 
English Dictionary Online is “[o]f, pertaining to, or 
characteristic of an enemy; pertaining to or engaged in actual 
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hostilities” and the secondary definition is “unfriendly in 
feeling, action, nature, or character; contrary, adverse, 
antagonistic.”7 Like most words, “hostility” contains a range 
of connotations depending on the perspective of the speaker 
or hearer as well as on the context of utterance. This range 
is exhibited with the milder characterization of hostility as 
“unfriendly in feeling” to the stronger characterizations as 
“antagonistic” and “characteristic of an enemy.” 
I take these stronger characterizations to predominate 
in most contexts, as is evidenced by Merriam-Webster’s 
definition of hostility as “deep-seated usually mutual ill will” 
and as “conflict, opposition, or resistance in thought or 
principle.” The synonyms Merriam-Webster provides for 
“hostility” are “animosity, animus, antagonism, antipathy, 
bad blood, bitterness, enmity, gall, grudge, jaundice, 
rancor.”8 All these words convey strongly negative 
sentiments that are held with conviction and deep feeling. 
Thus, hostility as used in ordinary English is constituted by 
a certain kind of intention that tends to result in actions 
aimed at thwarting, undercutting, or harming the object of 
hostility (both Merriam-Webster and the Oxford English 
Dictionary note the connection between “hostility” and 
“war”). In our examination of the differing claims of “hostility 
to religion” we will see that some justices lean into the strong 
negative attitude aspect of “hostility” while others seem to 
treat “hostility” as referencing a much wider class of 
oppositional stances one can take. 
  
 
 7. Hostile, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 8. Compare id. with Hostility, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam 
webster.com/dictionary/hostility (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
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VIDAL TO ENGEL (1844 TO 1962) 
The 1844 case Vidal v. Philadelphia is the first time a 
reference of hostility to religion appears in a Supreme Court 
opinion.9 In Vidal, the Court considered whether the will of 
a deceased millionaire that called for his fortune to be used 
to build a school for orphans, which barred “ecclesiastics, 
missionaries, and ministers of any sect from holding or 
exercising any station or duty in the college,” violated 
Pennsylvania public policy.10 In writing for the Court, 
Justice Joseph Story made a single reference to hostility in 
paraphrasing the argument of the plaintiffs. Story wrote 
that, 
This objection is that the foundation of the college upon the 
principles and exclusions prescribed by the testator, is derogatory 
and hostile to the Christian religion, and so is void, as being against 
the common law and public policy of Pennsylvania.11 
While Story doesn’t elaborate on what either the 
plaintiffs meant by hostility or what the Court took it to 
mean, he and his colleagues were unconvinced by the 
plaintiff’s arguments. The Court voted unanimously that the 
will did not violate public policy, mostly because of how 
limited they determined the harm to Christianity to be 
(Story points out that Christianity and scripture could still 
be taught at the school; it simply couldn’t be taught by 
teachers who were religious leaders by vocation).12 
It was nearly one hundred years until another reference 
to hostility to religion made its way into a Supreme Court 
opinion. The concept had a rather ignoble reintroduction as 
a comment in Justice Felix Frankfurter’s much criticized 
dissent in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.13 
 
 9. Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. 127, 197 (1844). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 197–98. 
 13. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (1943) 
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Frankfurter wrote that “[t]he essence of the religious 
freedom guaranteed by our Constitution is therefore this: no 
religion shall either receive the state’s support or incur its 
hostility” and that “[r]eligion is outside the sphere of political 
government.”14 He made these comments in service of the 
following conclusion. 
An act compelling profession of allegiance to a religion, no matter 
how subtly or tenuously promoted, is bad. But an act promoting 
good citizenship and national allegiance is within the domain of 
governmental authority and is therefore to be judged by the same 
considerations of power and of constitutionality as those involved in 
the many claims of immunity from civil obedience because of 
religious scruples.15 
His claims about religion were meant to serve as a 
contrast category for the point he wanted to make about 
national allegiance. Frankfurter’s views about forced 
expression of national allegiance have failed to make it out 
of his dissent and into future majority opinions, but the 
contrasting claims he made about religion represent the first 
articulation in a Supreme Court opinion of a now 
commonplace part of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.16 
Frankfurter’s primary concern in his analogy seemed to 
be that it would be unconstitutional for a religion to receive 
the same kind of support from that state that he was 
advocating views about national allegiance should receive. 
But in doing so Frankfurter sensibly noted that, just as the 
government cannot improperly put a thumb on the scale in 
favor of religion, so too it cannot improperly put a thumb on 
the scale against religion either. Frankfurter’s recognition 
that the state can express neither support nor hostility 
 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 654–55.  
 16. I speak of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause as two 
related, but separate entities. However, I don’t believe anything I say here turns 
on this. One could just as easily see non-establishment and free exercise as two 
aspects of the same provision. 
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toward religion is a prototypic pronouncement that the 
Establishment Clause requires that the government act 
neutrally toward religion, with neutrality requiring neither 
favoring nor disfavoring religion (either a particular religion 
or religion generally). 
The phrase “hostility to religion” gained its first 
reappearance in a majority opinion just five years later in 
Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education, where Black wrote: 
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any 
or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines 
and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest a governmental 
hostility to religion or religious teachings. A manifestation of such 
hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied 
in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion.17 
Like Story and Frankfurter, Black doesn’t tell us what 
he means by hostility to religion. Rather he only gives us an 
example of what does not count as “manifesting a 
governmental hostility to religion” and sensibly points out 
that hostility to religion on behalf of the government is 
incompatible with the free exercise of religion of that 
government’s citizens. Because Black does not explain what 
he means by “hostility,” it seems most prudent to assume he 
had the everyday usage of the term, as it was used in his day, 
in mind. 
There are two other points worth making about Black’s 
comments. First, like Story, his discussion of hostility to 
religion seems to have been prompted by the arguments of 
the petitioners. This continued to happen with regularity in 
the years that followed. Advocates of expansions of religious 
free exercise rights seem to gravitate toward the argument 
that the perceived infringements on those rights are 
instances of hostility to religion. These claims often fail, as 
they did in McCollum, but they often succeed as well, as we 
 
 17. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948). 
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will soon see. 
Second, Black talks about whether the hostility would be 
made “manifest”. Something is manifested when a 
reasonable observer can conclude that the thing manifest is 
present. Thus, for hostility to be made manifest, in the 
ordinary usage of such a phrase, a reasonable observer can 
conclude that the conscious enmity or desire to undercut the 
object of hostility is present on behalf of the hostile subject. 
Some of the conflict we’ve seen in more recent years over 
claims of hostility to religion seem best viewed as substantive 
differences of opinion concerning which actions reasonably 
reveal hostility to religion. This is easy to understand if we 
think about the deep emotional and personal feelings many 
of us have toward religion (whether those feelings be 
positive, negative, or mixed). How different justices and 
commentators have made these assessments is something 
worth paying attention to as we examine subsequent cases.18 
Over the next decade and a half, a couple more 
references of hostility toward religion were made in keeping 
with the ones that preceded. In the 1952 case Zorach v. 
Clauson, Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the 
majority, put into more straightforward language a principle 
that was latent in the comments that had come before; 
writing that “we find no constitutional requirement which 
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion” 
and that “[w]e cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a 
philosophy of hostility to religion.”19 The idea here, which can 
 
 18. The language of manifesting hostility also appears in Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“To suggest that a moment-of-
silence statute that includes the word ‘prayer’ unconstitutionally endorses 
religion, while one that simply provides for a moment of silence does not, 
manifests not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”) and McDaniel v. Paty, 
435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the Tennessee 
law which excluded ministers from holding public office “manifests patent 
hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion; forces or influences a 
minister or priest to abandon his ministry as the price of public office; and, in 
sum, has a primary effect which inhibits religion.”). 
 19. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1952).  
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be read out of Frankfurter’s and Black’s comments, is that 
the Establishment Clause requires detachment from religion 
only up until the point that neutrality is achieved, but not so 
far that the actions of government begin actively 
undercutting or showing enmity toward religion. 
In the seminal 1962 case Engel v. Vitale, Black in his 
majority opinion again responds to the argument of a party 
by rejecting their claim that the action under question 
represented government hostility to religion in writing that 
“[i]t has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such 
a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment 
of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility 
toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could 
be more wrong.”20 But of greater significance for the 
development of discussion of hostility to religion in the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is Douglas’s 
statement in concurrence that “[t]he First Amendment 
leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to 
religion but of neutrality.”21 This statement is a variant of 
Frankfurter’s “no religion shall either receive the state’s 
support or incur its hostility.” There Frankfurter articulates 
two things that religion should not receive from the state. 
Here, Douglas states what religion should receive instead: 
neutrality. 
These first five cases provide us with many of the seeds 
for the cumbersome weedy row that talk of hostility to 
religion has grown into in Supreme Court First Amendment 
jurisprudence. These cases also laid the groundwork for the 
Supreme Court’s first prolonged engagement with the 
concept in 1963 in School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp. Note that in all the cases we’ve encountered so far 
none of the justices have clarified what they mean by 
“hostility to religion.” As previously stated, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the justices saw themselves as 
 
 20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433–34 (1962).  
 21. Id. at 443. 
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using the word “hostility” in its ordinary usage in the absence 
of stating otherwise. However, as is often the case with words 
that are found in pithy Court maxims like “no religion shall 
either receive the state’s support or incur its hostility,” “we 
cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of 
hostility to religion,” and “the First Amendment leaves the 
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of 
neutrality,” in subsequent contexts such maxims and their 
component parts begin to take on a life of their own, where 
their future meaning is shaped by the previous contexts of 
use in Court opinions alongside new applications. This 
process appears to have started for the word “hostility” as 
used in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of 
“hostility to religion” in Schempp. In covering what the 
justices had to say about hostility to religion in the case, I 
will provide my reasons for this view.  
654 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
SCHEMPP TO ALLEGHENY COUNTY (1963 TO 1989) 
In Schempp the Court considered two consolidated cases; 
both dealing with the constitutionality of required Bible 
reading in school.22 An eight-member majority determined 
that such a requirement violated the First Amendment.23 
Justice Tom Clark writing for the majority referenced 
hostility to religion only in passing in the following: 
We agree of course that the State may not establish a “religion of 
secularism” in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing 
hostility to religion, thus “preferring those who believe in no religion 
over those who do believe.” We do not agree, however, that this 
decision in any sense has that effect.24 
This quick reference seemed to have served only to stake 
a position in a discussion that occurred within Schempp’s 
concurrences and dissent. 
Justice William Brennan wrote a lengthy concurrence in 
Schempp where he discussed, among other things, the 
“settled” position “that in order to give effect to the First 
Amendment’s purpose of requiring on the part of all organs 
of government a strict neutrality toward theological 
questions, courts should not undertake to decide” questions 
related to things like “internal ecclesiastical disputes” and 
the “subject of the doctrinal theology.”25 Because Douglas 
had contrasted neutrality to religion with hostility to religion 
the year before, it makes sense that Brennan might do the 
same, and he did in fact do so. In discussing the case of 
Ballard v. United States, the 1944 mail fraud case in which 
the Court held that the First Amendment barred Courts from 
assessing the truth of a religious belief, Brennan wrote the 
following: 
The case [Ballard] shows how elusive is the line which enforces the 
 
 22. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314). 
 25. Id. at 243 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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Amendment’s injunction of strict neutrality, while manifesting no 
official hostility toward religion—a line which must be considered 
in the cases now before us. Some might view the result of the 
Ballard case as a manifestation of hostility—in that the conviction 
stood because the defense could not be raised. To others it might 
represent merely strict adherence to the principle of neutrality 
already expounded in the cases involving doctrinal disputes. 
Inevitably, insistence upon neutrality, vital as it surely is for 
untrammeled religious liberty, may appear to border upon religious 
hostility.26 
Brennan closed his discussion of this topic by stating 
that “[f]reedom of religion will be seriously jeopardized if we 
admit exceptions for no better reason than the difficulty of 
delineating hostility from neutrality in the closest cases.”27 
Brennan’s point that the line between neutrality and 
lack of neutrality can be elusive has been validated by the 
hair-splitting that has occurred at points in Supreme Court 
First Amendment religious freedom jurisprudence. But if we 
are keeping in mind the ordinary language usage of hostility 
as containing “ill will,” “enmity,” or “antagonism,” it does not 
seem at all clear that the line between neutrality and 
hostility is elusive, for hostility is a far cry from neutrality. 
This is not to say there won’t be some circumstances where 
hostility is cleverly disguised such that it is hard to tell the 
difference between hostility and a “strict adherence to the 
principle of neutrality.” Rather it is to say that ordinarily, in 
the absence of deception, neutrality and hostility do not 
border one another.  
How are we to make sense of what Brennan has done 
here? I think the answer comes in at least two parts. First, 
Brennan is talking about perceptions of hostility and 
neutrality as much as he is about actual instances of neutral 
behavior and hostile behavior. And as the strong 
disagreements that exist within society as to what 
constitutes neutrality to religion versus hostility to religion 
show, Brennan certainly has a point that the same decision 
 
 26. Id. at 245–46.  
 27. Id. at 246. 
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can easily be viewed as being neutral by some audiences and 
hostile by others, depending on their perspective. But he is 
not merely talking about perceptions of neutrality and 
hostility. He also seems to be talking about the concepts of 
neutrality and hostility themselves. The other part of the 
explanation for what Brennan has said here is that, building 
upon the uses of the term “hostility” in earlier opinions, 
Brennan has expanded the ordinary definition of hostility in 
the context of “hostility to religion” to encompass the entire 
range of instances in which the thumb is on the scale against 
religion. This expansion takes “hostility” a step away from 
its ordinary meaning and into a kind of quasi-technical role 
in the context of religious freedom jurisprudence. 
Brennan doesn’t appear to have been alone at the time 
in making this expansion. Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote in 
a separate concurrence, joined by Justice John Marshall 
Harlan II, that “untutored devotion to the concept of 
neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which 
partake not simply of that noninterference and 
noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution 
commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the 
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the 
religious.”28 Goldberg makes an astute observation that 
“untutored” devotion to neutrality can lead to 
overzealousness and overexpansiveness in enforcement. 
However, when it comes to hostility itself, Goldberg’s 
discussion of “passive, or even active, hostility” may sound 
odd if one has the ordinary meaning of “hostility” in mind. 
Hostility in its ordinary guise is active—it’s combative, 
antagonistic, warlike. It’s not passive. Yet, Goldberg’s 
construction reads as if passive hostility is the default, and 
active is the exception. Disdain can perhaps be passive, in 
the sense that one shows so little value or respect for the 
object of one’s disdain that they give little thought or 
consideration to the object. But hostility is more than mere 
 
 28. Id. at 306 (J. Goldberg, concurring). 
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disdain. 
How are we to make sense of Goldberg’s worry that we 
may accidentally slip into hostility toward religion? I think 
the answer is that Goldberg had the expansive, somewhat 
technical definition of “hostility” that Brennan had—i.e. 
hostility as encompassing the entire range of situations 
where religion is inappropriately stifled, inhibited, or 
disfavored. With this expansive definition in mind, 
Goldberg’s treatment of passive hostility as the default is a 
recognition that most circumstances in which one begins 
inhibiting religion because of overeager enforcement of 
neutrality toward religion are going to be instances where 
one is passive in their desire to inhibit religion itself. The 
focus, after all, in such cases is neutrality, not religion. And 
the recognition of “even active” hostility is keeping open the 
possibility that this overzealous enforcement of neutrality 
could, on occasion, go so far as to constitute an active 
inhibition of religion, where inhibition of religion becomes 
the new object (or can rightfully be perceived as such). But it 
is important to keep in mind that this circumstance seems to 
be the exception, not the norm. 
The lone dissenter, Justice Potter Stewart, also adopted 
this expansive understanding of religious hostility, this time 
via Black’s opinion in McCollum. Stewart begins by appeal 
to the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case, which did 
not appeal to hostility to religion in its analysis.29 Stewart 
wrote that “there is an inherent limitation upon the 
applicability of the Establishment Clause’s ban on state 
support to religion,” which he characterized using Everson’s 
language that “[s]tate power is no more to be used so as to 
handicap religions than it is to favor them.”30 Here, we see 
again the recognition that a failure to be neutral can be 
 
 29. There was reference to “general hostility to dissentient groups,” but this 
does not seem to have carried any substantive weight in the analysis. See Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 36 (1947). 
 30. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 311 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson, 330 
U.S. at 18). 
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either positively-valenced in favor of religion or negatively-
valenced to disfavor religion (e.g. to “handicap religions”). 
But Stewart does not stop there. He then states that 
“this Court recognized that the limitation was one which was 
itself compelled by the free exercise guarantee.”31 Stewart 
then concludes with Black’s language from McCollum that a 
manifestation of hostility to religion would “be at war with 
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s 
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.”32 Stewart went out 
of his way, not only to connect Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, but 
to link the general disfavor of religion expressed as 
handicapping in Everson with hostility as used in McCollum. 
Over the next twenty years, speaking of “hostility to 
religion” as consisting of anything on the negative side of 
neutrality toward religion was continually cemented and 
reshaped into new pithy and repeatable constructions. It 
became commonplace, as Professor Frank Ravitch put it, to 
“treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality as two sides of 
the same coin.”33 For example, in the 1968 case Epperson v. 
Arkansas, Justice Abe Fortas writing for the majority wrote 
that government “may not be hostile to any religion or to the 
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote 
one religion or religious theory against another or even 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 311–12 (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 211–12 (1948)). 
 33. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What is 
“Hostile” to Religion Under the Establishment Clause? 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1034 (2004). My claims are somewhat stronger than Ravitch’s, who wrote that 
“the Court seems poised to treat” neutrality and lack of hostility as two sides of 
the same coin. Id. I agree that the Court is so poised, but it seems to be that the 
Court has in fact adopted this position and held to it for quite some time. 
However, I am also arguing that this is not the only way in which the Court has 
characterized and used the concept of hostility in the context of freedom of 
religion. Ravitch rightly noted, with appropriate disapproval, of the separation 
between this technical use of “hostility” as non-neutrality and what he calls 
treatment that is actually hostile. 
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against the militant opposite.”34 He also wrote that the “First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”35 Here, Fortas nuances what counts as favor of 
religion, listing that the government must not “aid, foster, or 
promote” religion. But he does not do the same in considering 
what counts as disfavoring religion. Rather, he keeps 
“hostility” to religion as the blanket expression for the whole 
category of disfavor toward religion.36 
Note that through all of this, we have yet to see an 
instance where a justice explained what they meant by 
hostility to religion, other than via contrastive references to 
neutrality (and Goldberg’s language implying that hostility 
can be passive or active). Rather, what we get is repetition of 
principles and applications of those principles to new 
situations. Most were attempts to further define either 
 
 34. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).  
 35. Id. at 103.  
 36. In the years since Epperson, courts have continuously appealed to the 
language of Epperson and Schempp. See generally Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
708 (1986) (contrasting hostility with neutrality); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 
U.S. 503, 513 (1986) (holding that a prohibition against wearing a yarmulke 
while in uniform in United States air force was “based on a neutral, completely 
objective standard—visibility” and “was not motivated by hostility against, or any 
special respect for, any religious faith”); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 
475 U.S. 534, 554 (1986) (“The Establishment Clause mandates state neutrality, 
not hostility, toward religion.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985) 
(Burger, C.J.,  dissenting) (stating that barring the program in question show not 
neutrality but instead “nothing less than hostility toward religion and the 
children who attend church-sponsored schools”); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. 
Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 306 n.32 (1985) (“The District Court found no evidence 
that the Department was acting on the basis of hostility to petitioners’ religious 
beliefs.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (quoting Epperson, 393 
U.S. at 103–04) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 232–34, 243–53 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)) (discussing hostility towards religion); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (contrasting hostility with 
neutrality); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103–04) (calling for government to be 
neutral and stating that it “may not be hostile” and “may not aid, foster or 
promote” religion); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is 
the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment”). 
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(1) the boundary between neutrality toward religion against 
support, favor, aid, promotion, etc. or (2) neutrality toward 
religion against handicapping, disfavoring, being hostile to, 
etc. However, during this process there were a few points at 
which justices provided additional nuance as to how they 
understand hostility toward religion. 
For example, in the 1970 case Walz v. Tax Com. Of New 
York, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “hostility 
toward religion has taken many shapes and forms—
economic, political, and sometimes harshly oppressive.”37 
While this does not define “hostility,” it does identify certain 
forms that hostility can take and seems to characterize 
“harshly oppressive” hostility as an outlier. This all seems in 
keeping with the interpretation of “hostility” as any kind of 
disfavor toward religion. 
And in Lynch v. Donnelly, a 1984 case where the Court 
addressed whether a nativity scene included as part of a city 
Christmas display violated the First Amendment, Burger, 
again writing for the Court, introduced the new maxim that 
the Constitution “affirmatively mandates accommodation, 
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility 
toward any.”38 This maxim would appear to expand the set 
of things that religious hostility is contrasted with. Rather 
than seeing hostility as anything that is non-neutral to 
religion in a negative way, Burger’s maxim seems to imply 
that anything that falls short of accommodation of religion is 
hostility to it.39 
This pushes the understanding of hostility as used by the 
Court even further from the ordinary meaning of hostility. In 
most cases there are many ways in which we can fail to 
accommodate something without being hostile to it. In fact, 
 
 37. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
 38. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
 39. The relationship between “neutrality” and “accommodation” is another 
topic in Establishment Clause jurisprudence highly worthy of study, but would 
be a digression to pursue in depth at this time. 
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being neutral to something seems to be a state compatible 
with failing to accommodate something. Think, for example, 
of a dentist’s office that has a policy which says that anyone 
more than ten minutes late to their appointment won’t be 
seen. Let’s say I’m in a meeting that runs late. After the 
meeting lets out, I call the dentist’s office on my way, letting 
them know I’ll likely be more than ten minutes late, and ask 
for an accommodation. The dentist’s office denies me one. 
Here, they’ve failed to accommodate me, but it seems that 
they are merely treating me neutrally so long as they do not 
accommodate anyone else and that they are not exhibiting 
any disdain or animosity toward me. 
Despite Burger’s new maxim, just three years later in 
Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Antonin Scalia reasserted the 
view of “hostility” to religion as equivalent to all unfavorable 
deviations from neutrality toward religion. In fact Scalia did 
so perhaps more explicitly than the Court had yet done, 
writing that “we have consistently described the 
Establishment Clause as forbidding not only state action 
motivated by the desire to advance religion, but also that 
intended to ‘disapprove,’ ‘inhibit,’ or evince ‘hostility’ toward 
religion” and that “we have said that governmental 
‘neutrality’ toward religion is the preeminent goal of the 
First Amendment.”40 In doing so, Scalia links “hostility 
toward religion” with that which “disapproves” or “inhibits” 
religion. Disapproval of or inhibition of an object isn’t 
synonymous with being hostile to an object in the ordinary 
sense of the word “hostile.” But, after years of implicitly 
equating such terms within the context of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, Scalia was merely more explicitly identifying 
what the semi-technical phrase “hostility toward religion” 
had become. 
With Burger’s retirement from the bench in 1986, his 
push to expand the extent to which the Establishment 
Clause required accommodation (and the corollary push for 
 
 40. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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a wider range of activities to count as hostility to religion) 
may have continued to be overshadowed by the older view of 
hostility as anything non-neutral to religion. However, this 
more expansive view of what counted as hostility to religion 
(along with the expansive view of the Establishment Clause 
obligations to accommodate religion) found a new champion 
with the appointment of Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
Kennedy first expressed his views on hostility to religion 
in First Amendment jurisprudence in the consolidated case 
of Count of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 
where the Court held that a creche that was displayed alone 
at the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the First 
Amendment but that a Menorah that was part of a larger 
holiday display at the City-County Building did not.41 
Kennedy stated that the majority’s opinion reflected “an 
unjustified hostility toward religion” and “a hostility 
inconsistent with our history and our precedents.”42 
Citing the majority opinions in Lynch and Walz, 
Kennedy argued that “rather than requiring government to 
avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, the 
Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in 
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion 
plays in our society” and that “[a]ny approach less sensitive 
to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward 
religion, as it would require government in all its 
multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the 
exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious.”43 This is 
reminiscent of Burger’s claim that the Establishment Clause 
does not require mere tolerance, but accommodation. 
Further, Kennedy’s claim implies that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar aid to religion, which runs contrary to 
the view first announced in Epperson that government “may 
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory 
 
 41. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989). 
 42. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 657. 
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against another.”44 
Later in his dissent, Kennedy circled back to the topic a 
second time to add that, “the ability of the organized 
community to recognize and accommodate religion in a 
society with a pervasive public sector requires diligent 
observance of the border between accommodation and 
establishment. Our cases disclose two limiting principles: 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of 
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits 
to religion in such a degree that it in fact establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”45 
In summary, Kennedy’s view in Allegheny seems to boil 
down to the following two propositions. First, all the 
Establishment Clause requires is that the government 
neither coerce individuals to participate in religion nor 
provide direct benefit to religion such that a state religion is 
established (or would “tend” to be established). Second, 
anything short of accommodating and aiding religion borders 
on “latent hostility to religion.” Thus, Kennedy carried 
forward Burger’s expansive view of what constitutes hostility 
toward religion which, at least since the 1940s, seems to have 
been an outlier view. 
Kennedy was the lone dissenter who thought that both 
displays were constitutional. (Justices William Brennan, 
Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens thought neither 
display was constitutional.) And his deviations from 
precedent were explicitly rejected by his colleagues. Justice 
Harry Blackmun, who penned the opinion for the Court 
wrote the following in response: 
Although Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of 
harboring a ‘”latent hostility” or “callous indifference” toward 
religion, nothing could be further from the truth, and the 
accusations could be said to be as offensive as they are absurd. 
 
 44. Id. at 656 (quoting Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968)). 
 45. Id. at 659 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Justice Kennedy apparently has misperceived a respect for religious 
pluralism, a respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or 
indifference to religion. No misperception could be more antithetical 
to the values embodied in the Establishment Clause.46 
Not only did Blackmun reject Kennedy’s conclusion 
about what constituted hostility to religion, he also fleshed 
out the rather uninspiring call for neutrality to religion as 
encompassing the more deeply held value of respect for 
diverse religions and as an obligation to allow for religious 
pluralism in a liberal democracy. 
Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her 
concurrence praised the values of religious pluralism and 
rejected Kennedy’s characterization of hostility to religion, 
writing that, 
Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s assertions, neither the 
endorsement test nor its application in these cases reflects “an 
unjustified hostility toward religion.” Instead, the endorsement 
standard recognizes that the religious liberty so precious to the 
citizens who make up our diverse country is protected, not impeded, 
when government avoids endorsing religion or favoring particular 
beliefs over others.47 
However, O’Connor also expressed support for a view 
that was somewhat more expansive about what constituted 
neutrality to religion. A consequence of this would be a larger 
category of actions that would constitute hostility to religion 
if not permitted. O’Connor expressed this view, writing that, 
Judicial review of government action under the Establishment 
Clause is a delicate task. The Court has avoided drawing lines 
which entirely sweep away all government recognition and 
acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for 
to do so would exhibit not neutrality but hostility to religion. 
Instead the courts have made case-specific examinations of the 
challenged government action and have attempted to do so with the 
aid of the standards described by Justice Blackmun . . . .48 
 
 46. Id. at 610 (majority opinion). 
 47. Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 48. Id. at 623. 
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Justice John Paul Stevens also rebutted Kennedy’s 
position at two different points in his own dissent. At one 
point, Stevens quoted Black’s opinion in Engel at length, 
including the claim presented earlier that “[n]othing, of 
course, could be more wrong” than the view that “to prohibit 
state laws respecting an establishment of religious services 
in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or 
toward prayer.”49 
But of greater interest from the perspective of thinking 
about how hostility to religion ought to be viewed by the 
Court is Stevens’ other rebuttal. Citing Everson, Stevens 
wrote that, 
The suggestion that the only alternative to governmental support 
of religion is governmental hostility to it represents a giant step 
backward in our Religion Clause jurisprudence. Indeed in its first 
contemporary examination of the Establishment Clause, the Court, 
while differing on how to apply the principle, unanimously agreed 
that government could not require believers or nonbelievers to 
support religions.50 
It is not obvious what exactly Stevens considers the 
“giant step backward” to be. My best guess is that it is the 
removal of the middle-ground space between support and 
hostility that had long been characterized as neutrality 
toward religion. Stevens very reasonably could have 
interpreted Kennedy as arguing that anything less than 
support for religion was hostility to religion, and this indeed 
would be a substantial deviation from precedent. 
But there is a second way to understand this quote from 
Stevens—namely, as a recognition that hostility, understood 
in its everyday sense, is not a proper descriptor for anything 
that fails to comport with what the Establishment Clause 
guarantees. There are any number of incidental, accidental, 
or otherwise non-malicious ways in which religion can fail to 
 
 49. Id. at 653 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 433–35 (1962)). 
 50. Id. at 652 n.11 (citing Illinois ex rel Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 
15–16 (1947)). 
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be supported or treated neutrally that do not seem to 
constitute hostility in the ordinary sense of that word. Even 
with the focus on hostility to religion that Kennedy’s novel 
views on the matter provided, after nearly fifty years of 
hostility to religion playing a role as an important concept in 
First Amendment jurisprudence, still no justice had put 
forward a view as to what hostility was. But in Allegheny, 
Stevens supplied a new articulation of what it might not be. 
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CHURCH OF LUKUMI THROUGH 2017 
In the years leading up to the sea change brought about 
by the Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, 
where the Court held that valid laws of general applicability 
that burdened religion didn’t violate the Free Exercise 
Clause so long as they passed the rational basis test, the bulk 
of the discussion concerning hostility to religion had been 
Establishment Clause cases.51 However, the First 
Amendment religious freedom landscape after Smith created 
space for a new role for the concept of hostility to religion to 
play in free exercise cases. 
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the 
Court was faced with the question of whether a facially 
neutral (at least facially neutral according to the Court) 
ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice violated the Free 
Exercise Clause because of the city’s intent to suppress the 
ritual sacrifices of members of the Santeria religion.52 
Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court from which no 
member dissented and relied heavily on the hostility the 
town exhibited toward the Santeria in articulating why the 
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. 
In doing so, Kennedy expanded on the Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning hostility to religion in the free 
exercise context in two ways. First, he provided the new 
maxim that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against 
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”53 
This was an important move post-Smith, given that 
otherwise Smith would allow for suppression of religion and 
might incentivize those with such ambitions to attempt to do 
so as long as they were clever enough to think of a way to 
make their law appear neutral and generally applicable. The 
 
 51. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 52. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 
(1993). 
 53. Id. at 534. 
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Lukumi maxim gave the Court the necessary means to block 
such attempts. 
Second, after fifty years of hostility to religion playing a 
substantive and recurring role in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, in Lukumi, Kennedy provides the first 
extensive presentation of evidence of hostility to religion. 
Kennedy’s presentation of the hostility exhibited by the city 
of Hialeah and its residents is worth quoting at length. 
That the ordinances were enacted because of, not merely in spite 
of, their suppression of Santeria religious practice, is revealed by 
the events preceding their enactment. . . . The minutes and taped 
excerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in the record, 
evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the 
city council, and other city officials toward the Santeria religion and 
its practice of animal sacrifice. The public crowd that attended the 
June 9 meetings interrupted statements by council members 
critical of Santeria with cheers . . . . When Councilman Martinez, a 
supporter of the ordinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba 
“people were put in jail for practicing this religion,” the audience 
applauded. 
Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar 
vein. For example, Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief 
that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: “If we could not 
practice this [religion] in our home-land [Cuba], why bring it to this 
country?” Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the 
Church “are in violation of everything this country stands for.” 
Councilman Mejides indicated that he was “totally against the 
sacrificing of animals” and distinguished kosher slaughter because 
it had a “real purpose.” The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice 
an animal for consumption,” he continued, “but for any other 
purposes, I don’t believe that the Bible allows that.” The president 
of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: “What can we do 
to prevent the Church from opening?” 
Various Hialeah city officials made comparable comments. The 
chaplain of the Hialeah Police Department told the city council that 
Santeria was a sin, “foolishness,” “an abomination to the Lord,” and 
the worship of “demons.” He advised the city council: “We need to 
be helping people and sharing with them the truth that is found in 
Jesus Christ.” He concluded: “I would exhort you . . . not to permit 
this Church to exist.” The city attorney commented that Resolution 
87-66 indicated: “This community will not tolerate religious 
practices which are abhorrent to its citizens . . . .” Similar comments 
were made by the deputy city attorney. . . . 
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In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The 
ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The 
pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents 
and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms 
target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were 
gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals 
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances 
suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to 
achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. These 
ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed clear 
error in failing to reach this conclusion.54 
Kennedy’s choice of evidence, as well as his description 
of it, is important in several respects.  
In most previous instances, the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence concerning the religion 
provisions and hostility had centered around the 
consequences and effects of the law. However, in Lukumi the 
evidence Kennedy provided of hostility to religion was by and 
large about the motivations, attitudes, and expressions of the 
officials and citizens of Hialeah. Far less attention is given to 
the consequences of the law (and even when consequences 
were focused on, this seemed to be for the purpose of 
providing confirmatory evidence about intentions). This 
focus on motivations and intentions was used to generate 
Kennedy’s conclusions that the object of the ordinances was 
suppression of religion, that the ordinances targeted 
religious belief, and that they disclosed animosity toward the 
Santeria. Yet, despite these differences between the analysis 
in Lukumi and previous analyses of hostility to religion, 
Kennedy retains the pairing of hostility with neutrality in 
concluding that “the ordinances are not neutral.” What are 
we to make of all this? 
Several things are worth noting. First, Lukumi 
represents one of the clearest instances where hostility to 
religion is present in the everyday usage of the word 
hostility. Kennedy’s identification of the evidence showing 
animosity is very fitting here. But, such talk of animosity 
 
 54. Id. at 542. 
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strikes me as something that would have been out of place 
had it been used in a number of the other cases that dealt 
with “hostility toward religion.” In this case, it doesn’t make 
sense to treat “hostility” as on a par with all that which 
“disapproves” or “inhibits” religion as Scalia implied in 
Aguillard or with all that “handicaps” religion as Stewart 
suggested in Schempp. No, what Kennedy identifies seems 
to be something a good deal stronger. 
One way of viewing the matter is to conclude that, while 
the thing Kennedy identified in Lukumi is something 
stronger than what is identified as “hostility” in these other 
cases, this is only because the hostility in Lukumi happened 
to be particularly egregious and as a result was characterized 
using different terms. On this view, at the end of the day, all 
Kennedy’s uses of “hostility” remain synonymous, even if 
they are described in different ways based on the context of 
identification. The consequence of this view is that a very 
large number of instances where the government fails to 
accord as much support for religion as Kennedy sees fit are 
instances of the government behaving with animosity toward 
religion. This strikes me as a warped conclusion, so perhaps 
it is better to conclude instead that Kennedy has two 
different senses of hostility in mind: the one which is used as 
a contrastive term to neutrality or accommodation, and the 
other which is used for instances of a motivation to suppress 
religion or an animosity toward religion. I think the evidence 
as to Kennedy’s view in Lukumi is underdetermined. 
However, the conceptual point is much clearer. Not all 
instances that fail to be neutral toward religion (and 
certainly not all instances that fail to accommodate or aid 
religion) are instances of animus toward religion. If that 
conflation is the view we impute to the Court, we are 
imputing to them a rather obvious falsity, and I think it is 
best to avoid doing so unless the evidence is compelling. For 
this reason, I think the best conclusion is that post-Lukumi, 
the Court has two distinct uses of the term hostility that it 
employs. The first use is a semi-technical term of art used to 
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pick out all instances in which religion is not treated 
neutrally (or not supported or accommodated, on the more 
expansive Burger-Kennedy view). This sense of “hostile to 
religion” serves the same role as phrases like “disfavors 
religion” and “inhibits religion.” The second sense of 
“hostility” is the everyday sense of the term which is roughly 
synonymous with “animosity.” 
There also seems to be a divide in usage depending on 
the ideology of the justice. The technical definition of 
hostility as non-neutral in a manner that disfavors religion 
is more often used by moderate and liberal justices, while—
including Justice Kennedy as conservative on the topic of 
religious liberty—the more conservative justices have moved 
in the direction of a return to the ordinary language usage of 
“hostility” in the context of religion. One explanation is that 
conservatives may be more apt to perceive animus on the 
part of those whose actions inhibit or disfavor religion (along 
with being more apt to see actions as inhibiting or 
disfavoring religion to begin with) than liberals. 
As we look at the appeals to religious hostility that the 
Court has made since Lukumi, I will seek to show how the 
above characterization maps onto those cases. There have 
been some instances where the Court has continued to 
appeal to “hostility to religion” as the contrast class to 
neutrality to religion in any way that disfavors religion.55 
But there has also been an increase in referring to hostility 
in a manner that would seem to equate it with animus. In 
some cases, this has been explicit. For example, in City of 
 
 55. See, e.g., Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We should take this opportunity to scrap the 
‘pervasively sectarian’ test and reaffirm that the Constitution requires, at a 
minimum, neutrality not hostility toward religion.”). It seems noteworthy that in 
the latter case Justice Clarence Thomas saw the “neutrality not hostility” 
standard as a minimum; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The message 
is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious 
groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but 
hostility toward religion.”). 
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Boerne v. Flores, Kennedy, writing for the Court in the 1997 
case, stated that “[i]t is difficult to maintain that such laws 
are based on animus or hostility to the burdened religious 
practices or that they indicate some widespread pattern of 
religious discrimination in this country.”56 It is not obvious 
what Kennedy takes the relationship between “animosity” 
and “hostility” to be in his locution “animosity or hostility,” 
but it seems to me that the best reading is that putting the 
two terms in conjunction helps elucidate the meaning of each 
by their similarity to one another and inclusion together. But 
the connection between hostility as being something 
containing enmity or animus has also more recently been 
expressed in subtler ways. For example, in 2000, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, writing in dissent in Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe wrote of the majority 
opinion that it “bristles with hostility to all things religious 
in public life.”57 It is hard to see how that which means 
merely “disfavor” or “inhibition” can bristle, but that idea of 
bristling with animosity seems vivid and natural. 
  
 
 56. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
 57. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
Language is slippery and there are worse things that 
could happen to a Court than that it use a phrase in two 
diverging ways, particularly when the phrase in question 
isn’t typically dispositive. Prior to 2018, the only clear case 
in which a determination of hostility to religion played the 
dispositive role was Lukumi. However, in 2018 the role of 
“hostility toward religion” in First Amendment 
jurisprudence was elevated yet again via its dispositive role 
in the outcome of Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission and the important role that it 
played in the primary dissent, in Trump v. Hawaii. These 
cases are important for several reasons. First, both cases 
seem to continue the shift back toward using “hostility” in its 
ordinary sense while still linking hostility as a counterpart 
to neutrality. Second, both cases apply the legal concept of 
hostility to religion to new kinds of cases and in new ways. 
As a result, these cases highlight that it is high time that the 
Court confront more directly the meaning of “hostility to 
religion” and what exactly that phrase’s role in First 
Amendment jurisprudence ought to be.  
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with 
the question of whether a Colorado Court of Appeals ruling 
violated the First Amendment in its holding that a baker had 
violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by 
refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due 
to religious objections to same-sex marriage.58 A Colorado 
Administrative Law Judge concluded that Phillips had 
violated CADA, which bars, among other things, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in a place of 
public accommodation.59 This ruling was upheld by both the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado Court of 
 
 58. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1726 (2018). 
 59. Id. 
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Appeals.60 The baker, Jack Phillips, who is a devout 
Christian, argued that the ruling violated his constitutional 
rights to free exercise of religion and free speech.61 
However, the Supreme Court did not address the 
questions about the free exercise and free speech rights of 
the baker in connection with his refusal, instead holding that 
the Colorado order “must be invalidated” because the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission expressed “hostility” 
toward Phillips’ religious beliefs that “was inconsistent with 
the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied 
in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”62 This ruling is 
significant in terms of the role and understanding that 
“hostility toward religion” played in several respects. 
First, like Lukumi, this is an outlier case when compared 
to previous cases both because the analysis of hostility 
toward religion played was dispositive and, to a lesser extent, 
because it was a free exercise case rather than an 
Establishment Clause case. However, Masterpiece was 
unlike Lukumi in that Lukumi followed the bulk of previous 
cases in using the analysis of hostility to religion to assess 
whether or not a rule was constitutional.63 Masterpiece 
departed from this by applying an analysis of hostility to 
religion to an assessment of adjudication. This fact seems to 
have been important to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who 
wrote in her dissent that “[t]he different outcomes the Court 
features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we 
have previously held to signal a free-exercise violation.”64 For 
Ginsburg, as we will see shortly, the way in which the 
hostility to religion analysis was extended in Masterpiece 
was troubling, but for Kennedy the appeal to hostility to 
 
 60. Id. at. 1726–27.  
 61. Id. at 1724. 
 62. Id. at 1732. 
 63. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 527–28 (1993). 
 64. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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religion in Masterpiece was a natural extension of what had 
come before. 
As in Lukumi, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. 
Kennedy explained the motivation that assessing whether 
the adjudicatory bodies exhibited hostility toward religion 
played in Masterpiece, writing that “the delicate question of 
when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an 
otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be 
determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on 
the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance 
the State sought to reach.”65 Seven of the nine justices 
concluded that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
exhibited hostility toward Phillips’ religious beliefs in the 
sense that the Commission failed to behave neutrally toward 
Phillips’ religious beliefs.66 
In explaining the nature of the hostility, Kennedy offered 
two kinds of evidence. First, he appealed to specific claims 
made by two members of the seven-member Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission. Kennedy identified that one 
commissioner said that Phillips could believe “what he wants 
to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he 
decides to do business in the state” and that the same 
commissioner later stated that “if a businessman wants to do 
business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the 
law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look 
at being able to compromise.”67 He then provided a more 
extensive quote from a second commissioner who stated the 
following: 
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the 
last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to 
justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—
we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has 
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most 
 
 65. Id. at 1724 (majority opinion).  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1729. 
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despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their 
religion to hurt others.”68 
The second kind of evidence Kennedy offered was the fact 
that shortly after the Commission found Phillips liable, it 
concluded three other bakers hadn’t violated CADA when 
they refused to make cakes which contained words and 
symbols that expressed religious opposition to same-sex 
marriage.69 Kennedy concluded that “the difference in 
treatment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other 
bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of 
conscience and prevailed before the Commission” was 
“[a]nother indication of hostility.”70 
Kennedy raised a third issue based on the writings of the 
Colorado Court of Appeals, who reviewed de novo the 
decision of the Commission. Kennedy objected to the Court 
of Appeals’ claim that Phillips’ cake could be distinguished 
from the other three cases because “the Division found that 
the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of 
the offensive nature of the requested message.”71 Kennedy 
interpreted the word “offensive” here as being used in a 
subjective sense to refer to the adjudicators’ own 
determination of what was offensive. (We’ll return to this 
questionable reading of the claim later.) For now, what’s 
relevant is that Kennedy saw this as negative treatment 
toward religion as well, yet framed this recognition not in 
terms of hostility to religion, but rather as sending “a signal 
of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”72 But 
given the history of “disapproval” of religion also being a way 
of speaking about negative deviations from neutrality toward 
religion, if we understand hostility to religion in the semi-
technical sense as a negative deviation from neutrality in 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1729–30. 
 71. Id. at 1731. 
 72. Id. 
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treatment of religion, this amounts to the same thing. 
This leads us to the question of how we ought to best 
interpret what the Court meant in holding that the 
Commission exhibited hostility toward Phillips’ religious 
beliefs. There is ample evidence that the Court is using 
“hostility to religion” as synonymous with “lack of neutrality 
toward religion.” But there is also ample evidence to suggest 
that the Court is treating “hostility to religion” as 
synonymous with “animosity to religion.” On my account, for 
the Court to be using hostility toward religion in both these 
ways is for the Court either to be equivocating or to be 
appealing to an incoherent concept. I’ll first provide my 
reasons for concluding that the Court used “hostility toward 
religion” in both these senses (leaving aside the question of 
whether this leaves the Court in a position of equivocating or 
appealing to an incoherent concept). I’ll then turn to other 
relevant aspects of the Court’s use of hostility to religion in 
the Masterpiece case. 
Perhaps the most significant indicator that the Court 
treated hostility toward religion as both synonymous with a 
lack of neutrality to religion and synonymous with animosity 
is the Court’s expression of the holding of the case in both 
terms. For example, Kennedy writes that, 
For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treatment of 
Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment 
not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious 
viewpoint. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, supra, the Court made 
clear that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s 
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are 
hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in 
a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the 
illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise 
Clause bars even “subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of 
religion. Id., at 534. Here, that means the Commission was obliged 
under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral 
toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.73 
The above passage equates hostility not only with 
 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
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negative deviations from neutrality, but even subtle such 
deviations. However, as Kennedy continues his explanation, 
again citing to Lukumi, he explicates hostility in terms of 
animosity writing that,  
The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, 
and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention 
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all 
officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the 
Constitution and to the rights it secures.”74 
The concept of “hostility” is pulled in different directions 
in the concurrences as well. For example, Justice Elena 
Kagan, in her concurrence connects “hostility” with “bias,” 
while Justice Neil Gorsuch in his concurrence connects 
hostility with “judgmental dismissal.”75 To me, the former 
reads more in the vein of “hostility” as “non-neutrality” while 
the latter reads more in line with “hostility” as “animosity.” 
While for a majority of the justices in Masterpiece, as in 
Lukumi, the distinction between non-neutrality and 
animosity didn’t seem necessary to consider for the purposes 
of determining an outcome, it is not hard to envision a 
situation in which the distinction between these two 
meanings of hostility would itself be dispositive. 
While much of the discussion in the last several pages 
has focused on an ambiguity in the Court’s uses of the phrase 
“hostility to religion,” Masterpiece raises a number of 
additional matters of importance concerning the Court’s 
implementation of the phrase and the (perhaps incoherent) 
concept they mean to pick out with it. In what follows, I flag 
three additional points of difference between the way the 
Court appealed to hostility to religion in Masterpiece versus 
in previous cases. The first two points of difference are 
structural ones about the role that the identified hostility to 
religion played in generating the outcome. The third point 
 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 1733–34 (Kagan, J., concurring); Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
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deals with a change in what counted as sufficient evidence of 
hostility toward religion in Masterpiece. Based on the 
discussion that follows, I conclude that 1) the Court needs to 
get clearer on what hostility toward religion means and 
2) the Court ought to be shrinking rather than expanding the 
role that appeals to the phrase “hostility to religion” play in 
its jurisprudence. 
The first structural difference in Masterpiece is that, 
unlike previous cases, it is not clear that hostility to religion 
was a “but for cause” in the issue at hand, so to speak. By 
this I mean the following. In Establishment Clause cases in 
which laws are assessed to determine if they hostile to 
religion, generally the issue in those cases is whether the law 
would be in place but for hostility (typically cast as non-
neutrality) to religion. Similarly, in Lukumi one way to 
frame what the Court asked was whether the Hialeah 
ordinance against the slaughter of animals would have been 
in place but for hostility against the Santeria. However, in 
Masterpiece, the Court does not appear to have been 
concerned with whether Colorado would have ruled as they 
did but for the supposed hostility. 
This is evidenced in Masterpiece by the fact that at no 
point did the Court question the neutrality of the 
Administrative Law Judge who first determined that 
Phillips had violated CADA. And even when it came to the 
Commission, Kennedy’s opinion never suggested, contra 
Lukumi, that were it not for the hostility toward religion 
exhibited on by the Commission, that the ruling would have 
been reversed. Rather, the Court’s view seems to be the 
weaker position that the perceived lack of neutrality 
undermines confidence that Phillips was treated fairly. One 
of Ginsburg’s primary points in her dissent seems to be that 
potential lack of neutrality wasn’t enough to warrant 
invalidating the Colorado Court of Appeals decision, 
especially when there were other levels of independent 
decision-making. Ginsburg lays out this objection as follows. 
I see no reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners 
680 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
should be taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding cake 
to Craig and Mullins. The proceedings involved several layers of 
independent decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one. 
First, the Division had to find probable cause that Phillips violated 
CADA. Second, the ALJ entertained the parties’ cross motions for 
summary judgment. Third, the Commission heard Phillips’ appeal. 
Fourth, after the Commission’s ruling, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals considered the case de novo. What prejudice infected the 
determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and after the 
Commission? The Court does not say. Phillips’ case is thus far 
removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies, 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), 
where the government action that violated a principle of religious 
neutrality implicated a sole decisionmaking body, the city council.76 
This expansion of what type of procedure is assessed for 
hostility toward religion is a second structural way in which 
Masterpiece represents an expansive change in the role that 
appeals to hostility to religion in Supreme Court freedom of 
religion jurisprudence. In one respect, this expansion doesn’t 
strike me as problematic. Preserving neutrality along with 
an appearance of neutrality toward religion in adjudications 
is important, and it makes sense for the Court to examine 
such things in seeking to uphold the First Amendment. 
But someone might reasonably find troubling the way in 
which the Court downplayed the extent to which Masterpiece 
represented new territory in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. The framework created in Lukumi was used 
to assess the constitutionality of ordinances and the process 
by which they were passed. In Masterpiece, the Court 
extended the Lukumi framework to look at the 
constitutionality of a multi-level adjudicatory process, but 
never identified this as an extension of the doctrine. In so 
doing the Court breezed over the salient ways in which the 
two processes under examination differed. As Rutgers Law 
Professor Bernard Bell points out, “Jack Phillips’ lawyer 
herself did not object to any of the three ‘offending’ 
statements during the proceeding and never sought any 
Commissioner’s recusal. That failure to exhaust 
 
 76. Id. at 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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administrative remedies would ordinarily preclude 
challenging the Commission’s ruling on the grounds of 
Commissioner bias.”77 Bell also notes that “Masterpiece 
Cakeshop asserted a claim of bias for the first time in its 
briefs to the Colorado Court of Appeals” and even at that 
point identified only one of the comments considered in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion.78 Bell points out that if a recusal 
motion had been made the Commissioners “would have had 
an opportunity to explain their determination on recusal or 
provide context for their statements.”79 
Regardless of whether the Court should have denied 
certiorari given the earlier steps Phillips’ lawyers failed to 
take and the other administrative remedies that hadn’t been 
pursued, the point is that the Court’s ruling in Masterpiece 
fails to put forward any kind of developed view on when and 
how the possibility of hostility to neutrality within a multi-
level judicial proceeding ought to impact the rulings 
generated. The default rule as of now seems to be, find 
hostility at any level and regardless of what steps may or 
may not have been taken to address the hostility at earlier 
levels, once the hostility is identified, and the ruling ought to 
be invalidated. This seems to put too few expectations on 
parties to raise claims of potential bias or hostility in 
adjudicatory proceedings as they arise. And given the 
difficulty of predicting what an appeals court may consider 
an instance of hostility or bias, this puts trial, and mid-level 
courts of review in a difficult position. 
Thus, structurally, Masterpiece expanded the role that 
 
 77. Bernard Bell, A Lemon Cake: Ascribing Religious Motivation in 
Administrative Adjudications—A Comment on Masterpiece Cakeshop (Part II). 
YALE J. ON REG. (June 20, 2018), http://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-lemon-cake-
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 78. Id. (citing Appellants’ Opening Brief at 26, Craig v. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (2015), accessible at, 2015 WL 13622550; Appellants’ 
Reply Brief at 14–15, accessible at, 2015 WL 13622552). 
 79. Id. 
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appeals to hostility to religion play in free exercise 
jurisprudence 1) by treating a finding of hostility to religion 
as dispositive even without an argument that the hostility 
played a but for cause in the outcome, and 2) by applying the 
test of hostility toward religion to a multi-level adjudication. 
But Masterpiece is also significant because, like Lukumi, it 
provides us with another instance where the Court 
concentrates on what counts as evidence of hostility toward 
religion. However, in Lukumi the only reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence was that Hialeah had 
exhibited hostility toward the Santeria religion. By contrast, 
in Masterpiece the evidence Kennedy cites of hostility toward 
the baker’s religious beliefs is open to multiple 
interpretations. And only by adopting an uncharitable 
reading of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission can we 
make sense of the claim that the Commission displayed 
“elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the 
sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.” This 
highlights the slipperiness of the hostility toward religion 
test and provides additional reason to rethink its place in the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
In order to see how what was presented as evidence of 
the Commission’s hostility toward the baker’s religious belief 
is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, we need to 
look more closely at the evidence Kennedy offered of hostility 
to religion. Kennedy offered the statements of two members 
of the seven-member Commission and information about 
three other rulings made by the Commission as his evidence. 
Let’s look at each in turn. 
First, Kennedy provides two claims made by 
Commissioner Raju Jairam.80 Kennedy writes that Jairam 
“suggested that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to 
 
 80. Portions of this section were previously included in Mark Satta, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Hostile Interpretation of the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV.: Amicus (Apr. 12, 2019) 
https://harvardcrcl.org/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-hostile-interpretation-of-the-
colorado-civil-rights-commission/. 
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believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides 
to do business in the state.’”81 Kennedy also cites Jairam’s 
claim that “if a businessman wants to do business in the 
state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his 
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to 
compromise.”82 Kennedy acknowledges that these 
statements are ambiguous, writing that, 
Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different 
interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a 
business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual 
orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s personal views. On the 
other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive 
comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free 
exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view of the comments 
that followed, the latter seems the more likely.83 
It’s unclear whether “the comments that followed” that 
Kennedy refers to are the comments that follow in Kennedy’s 
majority opinion or the comments that followed in the 
original Commission hearing that Kennedy is quoting from. 
Because Kennedy is unclear on this point, let’s consider both 
interpretations. 
In looking at the context surrounding Jairam’s 
statements in the record for the Commission’s hearing, it’s 
hard to see how the context of the Commission hearing could 
lend credence to Kennedy’s interpretation that Jairam’s 
remarks were “inappropriate and dismissive comments 
showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise 
rights and the dilemma he faced.” At the hearing leading up 
to the first comment Kennedy cites from Jairam, another one 
of the Commissioners, Diann Rice, was offering her 
reasoning for thinking that the law under which charges 
against the baker were brought was a constitutional law. The 
transcript from the hearing quotes Rice as saying the 
following: 
 
 81. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
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I think that the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act is written in a very 
neutral manner. Some exceptions have been made for religious 
organizations or businesses or organizations that clearly serve a 
single sex. As noted a women’s clinic or some organization like that. 
But those are very clear—clearly delineated exceptions. If 
Masterpiece Cakeshop were—or Mr. Phillips were an ordained 
minister and he was only serving commissioners or congregates of 
his church that might be a different situation. But he is—does have 
a public business and is serving the public. So I—you know, I don’t 
think that this case falls within the exceptions . . . I think there is a 
very significant and important reason for the Antidiscrimination 
Act and a significant—it is a significant benefit to the state to have 
this statute and to enforce it.84 
After Rice concluded, the Commission Chair, Katina 
Banks, acknowledged Rice’s comments, agreed with them, 
and asked “does anyone else have anything they want to 
add?” It is at this point that Jairam spoke. The meeting 
transcript records a back and forth between Jairam and 
Banks as follows. 
Commissioner Jairam: I don’t think the act necessarily prevents 
Mr. Phillips from believing what he wants to believe. And—but if 
he decided to do business in the state, he’s got to follow (inaudible). 
And I don’t think the Act is overreaching to the extent that it 
prevents him from exercising his free speech. 
Chairwoman: Well, free speech we already—we talked about. But 
what do you think about his— 
Commissioner Jairam: His belief system, yes. 
Chairwoman: Right, right, his religious beliefs. 
Commissioner Jairam: We all have our own belief systems. 
Chairwoman: Yes. 
Commissioner Jairam: And, you know, as a businessman, I 
shouldn’t allow my belief system to impact how I treat people, 
bottom line. 
Chairwoman: Okay. That is the bottom line, Commissioner Jairam, 
thank you . . . To make sure I’m understanding, we’re saying that 
we think the statute—there are good reasons for the statute; that it 
 
 84. Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, Craig v. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 22–23 (May 30, 2014). 
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is valid; and that it’s neutral in general in its application simply—
just as the administrative law judge determined.85 
Several things are illuminated by this additional 
context. First, the Commission clearly has as one of its values 
that Colorado law be neutral toward religion (as evidenced 
by the comments of Rice and Banks). Second, the 
Commission offered a cogent rationale for concluding that 
the law in question was neutral toward religion. Third, 
Jairam seemed to be making an important and long-held 
distinction in United States First Amendment 
jurisprudence—namely, that the right to religious belief is 
absolute, but that the right to religious action is not.86 
Jairam’s point seems to be one about the ability of the state 
to impose reasonable and neutral restrictions on actions, 
even while the right to belief remains absolute. Fourth, the 
conversation is one that is blending together questions about 
free speech with questions about free exercise of religion. In 
this light, it takes a very uncharitable reading of Jairam to 
attribute to him the views that Kennedy does. 
Adding context to Jairam’s second quote even more 
strongly undercuts the interpretation Kennedy gives to 
Jairam’s statements. In the second quote, Jairam was 
responding to “an argument by the respondent” that “he 
didn’t offer to sell them a wedding cake, but he offered to sell 
them different products.”87 In expressing why he didn’t find 
that argument compelling, Jairam is recorded as stating the 
following. 
And I believe the—it was best said by the judges in the New Mexico 
case, where the laws are here just to protect individuals from 
humiliation and dignitary harm. And that they should be very clear, 
that is, we do not want people to feel undignified when they walk 
into any place of business and do business that, you know, serves 
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the public. 
And I will also, you know, refer—you know, I’m referring to the 
comments made by Justice (inaudible) in that case. And essentially 
he was saying that if a businessman wants to do business in the 
state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his 
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise. 
And I think it was very well said by that judge.88 
The added context presents the reader with the 
significant detail Kennedy omits that Jairam was offering a 
paraphrase of a New Mexico judge, not his own view. Once 
again it seems to me most plausible that Jairam’s underlying 
point is about the difference between the absolute right to 
believe and the more limited right to action, especially when 
acting as a proprietor in the public sphere. So when it comes 
to the comments of Commissioner Jairam, not only does the 
conclusion that Jairam made “inappropriate and dismissive 
comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free 
exercise rights” seem uncharitable; it is implausible full-
stop. 
But as stated earlier, Kennedy writes ambiguously about 
whether it is the context of the Commission hearing or the 
subsequent portion of his opinion that is supposed to make it 
clearer that Jairam’s comments exhibited hostility to 
religion. Having discussed Jairam’s statements, I turn to the 
subsequent portion of Kennedy’s opinion. After offering 
Jairam’s comments as evidence of hostility toward the 
baker’s religious beliefs, Kennedy cites a statement from a 
second commissioner at a later hearing. The transcript 
containing this comment attributes the statement to a 
“female speaker” who, based on the context of the 
conversation, appears to be another commissioner. The 
speaker is recorded as saying the following. 
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last 
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify 
all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—
 
 88. Id. 
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we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has 
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their 
religion to hurt others.89 
In discussing this quote Kennedy writes that, 
To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of 
rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in at least 
two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by 
characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial 
and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to 
compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to 
defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is 
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn 
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s 
antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination 
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.90 
At first blush, this Commissioner’s comments seem more 
plausible than Jairam’s comments as showing hostility 
toward the baker’s religious belief. But context once again 
complicates things, as does a careful look at what the 
Commissioner actually said. 
First, the context in which this quote is presented 
provides much less of a guide as to what the Commissioner 
might have meant. The statement was offered very near the 
closing of the meeting when the Chair was asking each 
member if they had any closing comments they wanted to 
offer before a final motion. The quoted Commissioner was the 
last to offer a comment at a point in which the conversation 
seemed already to have mostly wrapped up and in which it’s 
not clear how her comment connected to the comments that 
preceded hers. Kennedy takes as evidence of hostility toward 
the baker’s religion the fact that “[t]he record shows no 
objection to these comments from other commissioners.”91 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1729 (2018). 
 91. Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, Craig v. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 22–23 (May 30, 2014). 
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But it’s not clear what service responding to the comment 
would have served given that it doesn’t appear to have been 
material to the rest of the discussion at the hearing or to the 
outcome of any motions. Rather, it seemed merely to have 
been offered at a time in which the Chair was allowing each 
member to say their final words. 
Second, while it may be reasonable of Kennedy to 
assume that the Commissioner’s comment was about the 
baker’s belief, the Commissioner never actually references 
the baker in her comments at all. Rather, all the 
Commissioner states are some historical claims followed by 
an opinion that it’s despicable rhetoric to use religion to hurt 
people. But, given the comment’s acontextual nature, the 
Commissioner could just as easily be commenting about the 
possibility that the baker was feigning sincerely held belief 
in order to legally justify his discrimination. The 
Commissioner’s comment is mysterious. It’s an expression of 
sentiment, but it’s not clear how the sentiment was meant to 
map onto the case at hand or onto the baker’s beliefs. 
The takeaway from Jairam’s comments and the second 
Commissioner’s comments are different and it is worth 
noting those differences. In the case of Jairam, only on an 
uncharitable reading can he be viewed as having displayed 
hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs. In the case of 
the second Commissioner, that she exhibited hostility toward 
Phillips’ religion seems like a viable possibility, but if we look 
at what she actually said and at the context in which she said 
it, it is not obvious that this is so. At the very least it is not 
obvious in the way that a city attorney stating that “This 
community will not tolerate religious practices which are 
abhorrent to its citizens . . .” indicates hostility toward the 
Santeria religion when offered in the context of whether or 
not to pass a law banning the ritual slaughter of animals 
right after the Santeria obtained the proper licensing for a 
church in the city of Hialeah. 
The third piece of evidence that Kennedy offered was the 
fact that the Commission had ruled that three other bakers 
2020] UNCLEAR HOSTILITY 689 
hadn’t violated Colorado law, which protects customers on 
the grounds of religious creed as well as sexual orientation, 
when those bakers turned down requests to make cakes 
containing messages expressing religious opposition to same-
sex marriage. Kennedy writes that “[t]he treatment of the 
other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted 
as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is 
involved, quite apart from whether the cases should 
ultimately be distinguished.”92 I agree that this is one 
(among several) reasonable interpretations. But a 
“reasonable interpretation” standard seems to me entirely 
the wrong standard to adopt. Implicit in the claim that a 
“reasonable interpretation” of this fact was that there was 
inconsistency is that there are other reasonable 
interpretations in which there was not inconsistency. And it 
seems to me there are such reasonable interpretations, and 
that these other reasonable interpretations are far more 
plausible interpretations. 
For example, the cakes in the other three cases all 
involved specific text and symbols on the cakes that the 
bakers refused to apply. Thus, another reasonable 
interpretation is that the Commission treated the other 
three cases differently because they all involved explicit 
messaging, while the cake in Masterpiece arguably did not. 
The Supreme Court could choose ultimately to disagree that 
such a difference should matter, but that doesn’t change the 
fact that the Commission could have used that difference 
between the cases in good faith as a principled reason to 
reach different conclusions among the cases. Furthermore, if 
one is being charitable to the Colorado Court of Appeals, it 
seems more likely to me that when the Court of Appeals 
wrote that Phillips’ case could be distinguished from the 
other three cases because “the Division found that the 
bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the 
offensive nature of the requested message,” their point 
 
 92. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
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wasn’t that messages opposing same-sex marriage were 
offensive to them and that messages in support of same-sex 
marriage were not offensive to them. Rather, what they 
meant to highlight was that by asking for cakes with specific 
text and symbols, the customer in the other three cases was 
asking for them to make a much more explicit message that 
the bakers found offensive. The key to the distinction was the 
nature of the message the cakes contained, not who found 
the message offensive. So it would seem that at best all 
Kennedy offered was that bias on the part of the Commission 
against Phillip’s religious beliefs was but one of several 
reasonable interpretations of the evidence presented.93 
If the Court is going to invalidate a ruling on grounds of 
hostility to religion, it seems that the Court’s standard ought 
to be much higher than merely that a reasonable 
interpretation of a lower adjudicative body’s actions is that 
the actions indicate hostility toward religion. The Court’s 
framework seems to me to be a troublesome deviation from 
the standard in Lukumi where Kennedy wrote that “the 
neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances 
had as their object the suppression of religion.”94 
  
 
 93. See Mark Satta, Why You Can’t Sell Your Cake and Control it Too: 
Distinguishing Use from Design in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, HARV. CIV. 
RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV: AMICUS (July 10, 2019) https://harvardcrcl.org/why-
you-cant-sell-your-cake-and-control-it-too-distinguishing-use-from-design-in-
masterpiece-cakeshop-v-colorado/ (arguing at greater length that there are 
principled and legally relevant distinctions between Phillips’ case and the cases 
of the three other bakers). 
 94. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 
(1993) (emphasis added). 
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TRUMP V. HAWAII 
Masterpiece wasn’t the only high-profile case in 2018 to 
engage with the Court’s jurisprudence around hostility to 
religion. Weeks after the decision in Masterpiece, in Trump 
v. Hawaii the Court ruled 5-4 that President Donald Trump’s 
ban on entry into the United States of foreign nationals from 
seven countries, most of which were countries with Muslim 
majority populations, was a permissible exercise of 
presidential power. Chief Justice John Roberts, who wrote 
the opinion for the Court, referenced hostility to religion in 
two places, both of which seem to be responses to the dissents 
offered by Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor. In his first reference, Roberts writes the 
following. 
It cannot be said that it is impossible to “discern [from Trump’s 
travel ban] a relationship to legitimate state interests” or that the 
[Trump’s] policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Indeed, 
the dissent can only attempt to argue otherwise by refusing to apply 
anything resembling rational basis review. But because there is 
persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate 
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any 
religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.95 
Shortly thereafter, Roberts also writes that, 
The Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: 
preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and 
inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says 
nothing about religion. Plaintiffs and the dissent nonetheless 
emphasize that five of the seven nations currently included in the 
Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations. Yet that fact 
alone does not support an inference of religious hostility, given that 
the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population and is 
limited to countries that were previously designated by Congress or 
prior administrations as posing national security risks.96 
Roberts appears to be aiming to accomplish two different 
things here. In the first quote, Roberts offers a reason for why 
 
 95. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018). 
 96. Id. 
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an examination of the question of hostility to religion is the 
wrong test to apply in this case. In the second quote, Roberts 
presents an argument for why hostility to religion cannot be 
inferred in the case of the proclamation in question. 
There are a number of important points worth 
highlighting here. First, note that in the first of the two 
quotes provided from Roberts, the Chief Justice appears to 
be using the terms “animus” and “hostility” interchangeably. 
We will see that Sotomayor does the same in her dissent. 
Thus, the current Court seems very comfortable treating 
“hostility to religion” as synonymous with “animus to 
religion.” 
Second, Roberts’ argument that an examination of 
potential hostility toward the Muslim religion on the part of 
Trump is unnecessary strikes me as jurisprudentially 
mysterious. Roberts’ view seems to be that because rational 
basis is the proper test for determining if there is 
presidential authority to make the proclamation that 
somehow this entails that the question of whether or not 
there was hostility to religion becomes moot. This is 
mysterious because, as we have seen throughout this paper, 
traditionally assessments of whether or not there is hostility 
to religion—whether that is understood as a lack of 
neutrality, as animus, or as both—are ways of testing 
whether or not a constitutional violation of the First 
Amendment right to religious freedom has occurred. In 
Hawaii, the Court determined that three individual 
plaintiffs had standing because of the exclusion of their 
relatives.97 Even if, barring hostility to religion, a president 
has the authority to issue a ban on entry into the United 
States of the sort under question here, it seems that a 
separate question remains over whether the constitutional 
rights of the plaintiffs were violated if the motivation for the 
passage of the law was unconstitutional hostility against the 
religion of the plaintiffs and/or the plaintiffs’ relatives. 
 
 97. Id. at 2416. 
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Third, in looking at Roberts’ second quote, the single 
piece of data he dismisses (the fact that “[p]laintiffs and the 
dissent nonetheless emphasize that five of the seven nations 
currently included in the Proclamation have Muslim-
majority populations”) is portrayed in a manner implying 
that this was the only or primary piece of evidence put 
forward by the dissent that there was hostility to religion, 
but this radically underdetermines the evidence put forward 
by Breyer and especially the evidence put forward by 
Sotomayor, both of whom outline multiple reasons for 
concluding that the ban on entry was motivated by hostility 
toward religion. 
Fourth, in his second quote Roberts seems to be arguing 
merely that on its face the proclamation appears neutral to 
religion. But this seems to run counter to the principle put 
forward by Kennedy in Lukumi that “the Free Exercise 
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is 
masked as well as overt.”98 While Roberts doesn’t cite to 
Lukumi at all, it is one of the first citations in both Breyer 
and Sotomayor’s dissents and provides an important part of 
why both Sotomayor and Breyer frame the case very 
differently than Roberts. 
Citing Lukumi and Masterpiece, Breyer frames the heart 
of the issue in his dissent as follows: “If its [the ban’s] 
promulgation or content was significantly affected by 
religious animus against Muslims, it would violate the 
relevant statute or the First Amendment itself.”99 Breyer’s 
dissent then consists of looking at different potential sources 
of evidence for the claim that there was religious animus 
against Muslims. Breyer concludes his dissent with a two-
tiered conclusion. First, Breyer concludes as follows. 
 
 98. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. Given that this was Kennedy’s test, it also 
strikes me as jurisprudentially mysterious that Kennedy signed on to Roberts’ 
opinion. I say “jurisprudentially” mysterious, because sadly the matter is less 
politically mysterious, although just as troubling. 
 99. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Declarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and numbers taken from 
amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings. The Government has not 
had an opportunity to respond, and a court has not had an 
opportunity to decide. But, given the importance of the decision in 
this case, the need for assurance that the Proclamation does not rest 
upon a “Muslim ban,” and the assistance in deciding the issue that 
answers to the “exemption and waiver” questions may provide, I 
would send this case back to the District Court for further 
proceedings. And, I would leave the injunction in effect while the 
matter is litigated.100 
However, Breyer also stakes a claim on how he would 
rule should the Court have needed to decide the animus 
question at that time writing that, 
If this Court must decide the question without this further 
litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious 
bias, including statements on a website taken down only after the 
President issued the two executive orders preceding the 
Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, a sufficient basis to set the 
Proclamation aside.101 
Breyer’s dissent is important for several reasons. First, 
at no point does Breyer reference “hostility.” Rather, he uses 
phrases like “animus against religion” and “antireligious 
bias” in a manner that seem to be treated as synonymous 
with “hostility toward religion.” Second, while 
acknowledging that there is evidence of religious bias, his 
first choice of action was to let the lower court make a finding 
of fact concerning whether there was in fact bias present. Yet 
he was comfortable ruling on the question of bias in the 
Masterpiece case, where the same deference to letting a lower 
court sort out the issue of fact could have been offered. It is 
unclear whether Breyer saw Hawaii as relevantly different 
from Masterpiece, or if Breyer’s view in Hawaii is indicative 
of a shift away from his position in Masterpiece. 
The most extensive discussion of hostility toward 
religion in Hawaii occurs in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. As 
 
 100. Id. at 2433. 
 101. Id. 
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in Roberts’ opinion and Breyer’s dissent, Sotomayor links 
hostility to religion with both non-neutrality toward religion 
and animus toward religion. For example, in her opening 
paragraph she writes both that “[o]ur Founders honored that 
core promise by embedding the principle of religious 
neutrality in the First Amendment” and that “[b]ased on the 
evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude 
that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim 
animus. That alone suffices to show that plaintiffs are likely 
to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause 
claim.”102 
While Roberts ignored Masterpiece and Breyer seemed to 
deviate from his position in Masterpiece despite his 
referencing the case, Sotomayor called out the stark 
difference in treatment that claims of hostility toward 
religion received in the Masterpiece majority compared to the 
Hawaii majority, which was comprised of a subset of the 
Masterpiece majority. Sotomayor admonishes the Court for 
the quick change in perspective in the following paragraph. 
Just weeks ago, the Court rendered its decision in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, which applied the bedrock principles of religious 
neutrality and tolerance in considering a First Amendment 
challenge to government action. Those principles should apply 
equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a 
government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a 
decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom. 
But unlike in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission 
was found to have acted without “the neutrality that the Free 
Exercise Clause requires,” the government actors in this case will 
not be held accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of religious neutrality and tolerance. Unlike in 
Masterpiece, where the majority considered the state 
commissioners’ statements about religion to be persuasive evidence 
of unconstitutional government action, the majority here 
completely sets aside the President’s charged statements about 
Muslims as irrelevant. That holding erodes the foundational 
principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so 
emphatically protected, and it tells members of minority religions 
in our country that “they are outsiders, not full members of the 
 
 102. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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political community.”103 
Sotomayor highlights a troublesome slipperiness that 
seems to have invaded (or perhaps has always been present) 
in the Court’s appeals to hostility toward religion. It strikes 
me as worrisome that seven of the nine justices flipped sides 
on what they considered a sufficient expression of hostility to 
religion along partisan lines, and that even the two justices 
who saw hostility as present in both cases, Breyer and 
Kagan, suggested a different procedure for how that hostility 
ought to be handled in the two cases. In Sotomayor’s case, 
her switch in position alongside Ginsburg can be explained 
both by an appeal to the precedent her colleagues set down 
in Masterpiece and her view that the hostility in Hawaii was 
more severe. However, it is harder to explain the change in 
view of the five justice who remained in the majority for both 
decisions.  
 
 103. Id. at 2435 (internal citations omitted). 
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AMERICAN LEGION 
The Court’s most recent appeal to hostility toward 
religion occurred on June 20, 2019 when the Court delivered 
its opinion in Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 
2067 (2018). In American Legion, the Court held that the 
presence of a ninety-year-old World War I memorial in the 
form of a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Maryland does 
not violate the constitutional prohibition against 
governmental establishment of religion.104 The concept of 
hostility to religion does not taken center stage in this case 
like it did in Masterpiece or in Sotomayor’s dissent in Hawaii. 
However, the role that the concept of hostility toward 
religion plays in this case puts on prime display the harmful 
way in which the ambiguity over the meaning of hostility to 
religion has left the concept overly malleable and ripe for 
cooption for partisan ends. 
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for the Court in 
American Legion. Alito’s opinion relies heavily on the idea 
found in the Court’s precedent that symbols with religious 
origins can nevertheless gain additional secular meanings 
and purposes over time in the right contexts.105 The bulk of 
Alito’s opinion is devoted to supporting two conclusions. 
First, Alito argues that the Lemon test for assessing whether 
an action violates the Establishment Clause ought not apply 
in cases like American Legion.106 Second, Alito argues that 
the cross in American Legion represents one of those 
instances where a symbol with a religious origin took on a 
secular meaning of historical importance.107 On these 
grounds, Alito concludes that the presence of the cross on 
public land is “fully consistent” with the aim of the “Religion 
 
 104. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018). 
 105. Id. at 2082–83 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 688–90 (2005) 
and McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 845 (2005)). 
 106. Id. at 2080–87 (discussing the applicability of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971) to the issue at hand). 
 107. See id. at 2085–87, 2089.  
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Clauses of the Constitution.”108 
Alito not only makes the case that keeping the cross up 
and intact is consistent with the First Amendment. He also 
implies that removing the cross would be inconsistent with 
the First Amendment because the removal of the cross 
“would be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the 
manifestation of a hostility toward religion that has no place 
in our Establishment Clause traditions.”109 It is in making 
this latter point that Alito relies on the concept of hostility to 
religion. As we will see, he is clearly using “hostility towards 
religion” as “non-neutral toward religion.” However, given 
his interest in the appearances of hostility and neutrality by 
the American people, he also doesn’t seem to be using the 
phrase “hostility to religion” in a technical sense. 
To see more clearly what I mean, it will be useful to have 
before us Alito’s references to “neutrality” and “hostility” in 
his opinion. Alito first mentions both neutrality and hostility 
in the introductory paragraphs of his opinion stating that 
“removal or radical alteration [of the cross] at this date would 
be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the manifestation 
of a hostility toward religion that has no place in our 
Establishment Clause traditions.”110 This is noteworthy for 
the aforementioned reason that it contrasts hostility to 
neutrality. But it is also significant because it is ultimately 
not a statement about what is neutral or hostile to religion 
but about what “would be seen by many” as non-neutral and 
hostile. It is a claim about appearances and perception. 
(Perhaps those perceptions track reality, but it is reasonable 
to think that acceptance of this connection ought to be argued 
for.) 
This focus on appearance of non-neutrality and hostility 
remain the focus of Alito’s references of the topic. And Alito’s 
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 109. Id. (internal quotation marks removed) (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 
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points often are speculative claims about what may be 
viewed as non-neutral to partial portions of the population. 
For example, Alito next references neutrality stating 
that “when time’s passage imbues a religiously expressive 
monument, symbol, or practice with . . . familiarity and 
historical significance, removing it may no longer appear 
neutral.”111 He once again follows this up with a connection 
to hostility, writing that a “government that roams the land, 
tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and 
scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many 
as aggressively hostile to religion.”112 
Alito does not reference hostility again directly, but he 
does make two more references to neutrality. He next 
references neutrality, writing that “as World War I 
monuments have endured through the years and become a 
familiar part of the physical and cultural landscape, 
requiring their removal would not be viewed by many as a 
neutral act.”113 And in closing his opinion Alito writes the 
following. 
For many of these people, destroying or defacing the Cross that has 
stood undisturbed for nearly a century would not be neutral and 
would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance embodied in 
the First Amendment. For all these reasons, the Cross does not 
offend the Constitution.114 
It is only here at the very end of his opinion that Alito 
closes the gap between the possibility that removal of the 
cross would appear non-neutral to a portion of the 
population, to his conclusion that the presence of the cross 
does not offend the Constitution. 
Alito’s opinion in American Legion is instructive of two 
problematic aspects around the Court’s appeals to hostility 
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toward religion in constitutional cases. First, it continues the 
unacknowledged and increasingly frenetic swing between 
the Court’s usage of hostility as akin to animosity, as found 
in Kennedy’s Masterpiece opinion and Sotomayor’s Hawaii 
dissent and hostility as akin to mere non-neutrality, as was 
the case in Alito’s American Legion opinion.  
Second, Alito’s opinion showcases the role that 
ideological and partisan bias can play in assessments of 
neutrality or hostility to religion. Alito is diligent in 
assessing what may appear non-neutral or hostile to religion 
among those portions of the population that want the cross 
left up, but he never acknowledges the obvious fact that there 
are also Americans who clearly find the presence of the cross 
non-neutral to religion. This perception of non-neutrality is 
at the heart of what motivated the lawsuit by the American 
Humanist Association to begin with. Alito has implicitly 
adopted the principle that perceptions of an action being non-
neutral to religion are a reason to view it as non-neutral to 
religion. 
However, such a principle will consistently lead to 
inconsistent results whenever one portion of the population 
views an action as non-neutral to religion while another 
portion of the population views failure to do that action as 
non-neutral to religion. In the case at hand, this 
inconsistency went overlooked because Alito focused only on 
what might appear non-neutral to those in favor of the cross 
staying up: a portion of the population that is likely 
disproportionately comprised by individuals who adhere to 
the United States’ majority religion, Christianity, and as a 
result likely disproportionately excludes members of 
minority religions and the non-religious. When the 
perspectives of some are attended to in a way that the 
perspectives of others are not, and when such attention 
correlates with religious belief, this bakes non-neutrality 
right into the assessment of Establishment Clause 
violations. 
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REFORMS GOING FORWARD 
Having covered a thorough presentation of the history of 
the Court’s appeals to hostility to religion in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, it is time to take stock of what 
we’ve seen and to provide some recommendations for the way 
forward. Given the significant role that the concept of 
hostility of religion played in three high profile cases in the 
last two years alone, it is high time that more scrutiny be 
given as to how the Court has employed the concept and what 
it ought to do moving forward. 
In this closing section, I offer four suggestions dealing 
with how the Supreme Court should refine its jurisprudence 
concerning appeals to hostility toward religion. These 
suggestions are based on what’s been discovered in this 
paper about the Court’s practices heretofore. Part of my 
motivation for suggesting these modifications is that the 
Court’s appeals to hostility to religion have run parallel to 
discussions about hostility to religion in the larger political 
arena. As the language of the Court and summaries of the 
Court’s opinions get disseminated into the wider culture, the 
quasi-technical sense of “hostility to religion” as any form of 
non-neutrality to religion is apt to be lost, and the strong and 
vigorous war-like connotations of the term “hostility” are apt 
to take center stage. What is lost in translation between 
Court opinions and the wider culture runs the risk of stoking 
the culture wars and contributing to public 
misunderstanding of difficult jurisprudential issues. 
A thorough examination of appeals to “hostility to 
religion” in the public square would require far more space 
than would be prudent to include in this Article. However, 
before getting to my proposed modifications to the Court’s 
jurisprudence, I want to offer two anecdotes of the 
phenomenon of appeals to hostility to religion being 
disseminated into the broader cultural conversation around 
the relationship between religion and state. 
First, in 1984, when President Ronald Reagan was 
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advocating passage of a constitutional amendment that 
would allow organized prayer in public schools, the Los 
Angeles Times reported on the story with the headline 
“Reagan Pushes School Prayer: Says Government Must End 
Hostility to Religion.” The opening line of the article reads as 
follows. “Declaring that government must change its 
‘hostility to religion,’ President Reagan said Tuesday that a 
constitutional amendment allowing organized vocal prayer 
in public schools ‘would do more than any other action to 
reassert the faith and values that made America great.’”115 
Figuring out whether prominent culture references to 
“hostility to religion” predate the Court’s uses of the phrase 
or if it’s the other way around is a sort of chicken and egg 
question that for the purposes of this paper doesn’t need to 
be answered. But the point here is that Reagan couched his 
call for action specifically as a response to “hostility to 
religion.” In this wider cultural conversation around the 
proper relationship between church and state where the 
audience doesn’t have the same nuanced exposure to how the 
phrase has been used in Supreme Court jurisprudence, such 
audiences are apt to take judicial rulings declaring “hostility 
to religion” at face value using the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase. Thus, the Court has the power—even if at points it 
is wielding the power unwittingly—to stoke or dampen the 
culture wars over what it identifies as hostility to religion by 
legitimatizing and sanctioning viewing certain acts as 
exhibiting “hostility to religion.” 
The second anecdote shows even more clearly the 
difficulties that the mismatch between the Court’s quasi-
technical definition of “hostility to religion” and the more 
ordinary meaning of that phrase can cause for those 
speaking about legal issues about church and state in the 
public square. At the end of the Court’s 1996–1997 term, 
Harvard Professor Mary Ann Glendon wrote an op-ed in the 
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New York Times discussing two of the Court’s end of year 
rulings dealing with the Establishment Clause. In her op-ed 
Professor Glendon, who believes the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of religion is best viewed as a single 
provision, wrote that “[i]n the 1940’s, several Justices, with 
ill-disguised hostility to religion, set the two ‘clauses’ of the 
First Amendment in opposition to each other.”116 In 
response, New York University Law Professor, Nadine 
Strossen, who was at the time the President of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, wrote a letter to the editor arguing 
that “Mary Ann Glendon perpetuates a widespread myth as 
dangerous as it is false when she equates vigorous 
enforcement of the Establishment Clause with ‘hostility to 
religion’ . . . . In the words of former Supreme Court Justice 
Harry Blackmun, ‘nothing could be further from the truth’ 
than to ‘misperceive a respect for religious pluralism, a 
respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or 
indifference to religion.’”117 
It seems to me quite likely that Glendon and Strossen 
were expressing a genuine difference of opinion that 
attentiveness as to the proper meaning of “hostility to 
religion” on its own would not have solved. Yet, the Court’s 
disparate treatment of what it means by “hostility to 
religion” adds fuels to the disagreement and obscures the 
meaning of their claims. After all, Strossen explicitly appeals 
to the Court’s precedent in her response, and Glendon, who 
is a leading scholar in Constitutional freedom of religion, no 
doubt has had her understanding of what constitutes 
hostility toward religion shaped by the Court’s precedent. 
But all this is likely lost for most New York Times readers 
who will be tapping into only the common connotations of the 
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word “hostility” in interpreting the exchange between 
Strossen and Glendon. 
The suggestions that follow thus aim at improving the 
Court’s jurisprudence on two levels. First, the suggestions 
are meant to help make the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence clearer and more coherent. Second, the 
suggestions are meant to help improve the expressive value 
and expressive effectiveness of the Court’s decisions about 
religious freedom to the wider public.118 The suggestions are 
as follows. 
First, the Court should begin adopting language that 
acknowledges the distinction between all that which is non-
neutral to religion versus that which actively exhibits 
animosity toward religion. Using “hostility to religion” as a 
contrast class to “neutrality toward religion” (or in the case 
of Burger and Kennedy as a contrast class for that which 
doesn’t “accommodate religion”) is a historical accident that 
we don’t have any good reason to continue. Rather, the Court 
can make its points clearer by using other language it has 
historically appealed to in pointing out that something fails 
to be neutral to religion. For example, justices can continue 
to speak of that which disfavors or inhibits religion. From the 
perspective of choosing language that best represents the 
point, to say that the law ought to be neutral to religion is 
better served by pointing out that laws should neither favor 
nor disfavor religion or should neither advance nor inhibit 
religion. There is no need to appeal to hostility to religion 
when simply trying to make the point that a law which 
disfavors or inhibits religion fails to be neutral to religion. 
The reason for this is that when the point is that religion is 
merely disfavored or inhibited by a law, what one needs to 
convey is that religion is harmed by the law. The key point is 
about the consequences to religion; not about the attitudes or 
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aims of lawmakers or judges. When harmful consequences to 
religion are the focus, using less loaded language like 
disfavoring or inhibiting religion can make that clearer. 
On the other hand, there are indeed instances in which 
it is appropriate to call out active hostility against religion as 
in Lukumi. In such cases, presumably the point the Court is 
trying to make is one not just about consequences for 
religion, but also about the attitude of the lawmakers or law 
enforcers. In such a case the language of hostility is more 
appropriate. However, even here if one wanted to avoid 
getting entangled in the messy history of appeals to hostility 
to religion by the Court, a lawyer or justice can use the 
language such as “animosity” or “ill-will” instead of 
“hostility.” Creating this linguistic bifurcation between two 
concepts, both of which are currently picked out by the 
phrase “hostility to religion,” would allow the Court to issue 
clearer opinions. 
Second, because “hostility” in its ordinary sense has 
implications for the internal thoughts and attitudes of the 
subject who is hostile, the Court would benefit from being 
more cautious in attributing the attitude of hostility to others 
when the evidence is indeterminate or ambiguous. The 
Masterpiece case is a good example. Despite acknowledging 
the underdetermination of the evidence, because Kennedy 
viewed it as reasonable to interpret the evidence as a 
manifestation of hostility on the part of the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, he imputed hostility to them. From the 
vantage point of the ordinary use of the phrase, accusing a 
lawmaker or adjudicator in a liberal democracy of being 
hostile to religion is a weighty charge. It is an accusation that 
should be levied judiciously. And it seems to me that when 
hostility toward religion is but one reasonable interpretation 
of the evidence, that levying an accusation of hostility toward 
religion is imprudent. If the Court’s point in Masterpiece was 
that the adjudication process was infiltrated with a lack of 
guarantee of objectivity, there are ways to make this point 
without attributing hostile bias to the parties in question. 
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Alternatively, if the point was that there may have been bias 
in the process based on appearances, a more fitting remedy 
would seem to be remanding rather than simply 
“invalidating” without further guidance or instruction. 
Third, because of the ambiguity present in the Court’s 
appeals to hostility to religion, it is unclear what exactly the 
principle laid out in Lukumi and further applied in 
Masterpiece is. What precisely did the Court mean when it 
held that “the Free Exercise Clause protects against 
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt”? Is 
this merely a tautological principle that cases like Lukumi 
aren’t Smith-style cases because the relevant laws are not 
neutral laws of general applicability and therefore hostile to 
religion in the sense of “hostile” as “non-neutral”? Or was the 
Court saying something more specific about how laws that 
are neutral in application can still be found unconstitutional 
if animosity toward religion motivated their passage? As of 
right now, it’s not clear what the answer to this question is, 
but the outcome of a future case could easily hang on this 
distinction. If the Court clarifies what it means by “hostility 
to religion” this can help sort out ambiguities involving 
hostility to religion in the Court’s developing First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Fourth, if the Court is going to take into consideration 
perceptions of hostility to religion as a salient factor in 
determining what does and does not violate the 
Establishment Clause, as the Court did in American Legion, 
then the Court needs to be careful that it not only focus on 
the perceptions of some portions of the population. If it 
matters that some Christians will find taking down a cross 
on public land to be hostile to their faith, it should matter 
just as much that some Jews (and some other Christians for 
that matter) will find keeping the cross up on public land 
hostile to their faith or other faiths. The Court can’t pick and 
choose whose perceptions of hostility matter. 
In this paper, I’ve aimed to show how the development of 
appeals to “hostility to religion” on the Supreme Court has 
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contained much that is a product of chance and a lack of 
careful definition. Given what the doctrine has grown into, it 
is high time that the Court be more intentional in how it 
makes these appeals. The suggestions I offered in this final 
section provide a way to make that start.  
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CONCLUSION 
The recent trends exhibited in Masterpiece, Hawaii, and 
American Legion suggest that the concept of hostility to 
religion is waxing, not waning, in influence. And as the 
significant public interest generated by these cases shows, 
how the Court expresses its views in cases like these can 
have an impact on how the relationship between church and 
states is perceived on a broader cultural level. Heretofore, 
the Court has not offered an explanation as to what 
constitutes hostility to religion in its jurisprudence, and in 
the absence of that explanation, problematic and ambiguous 
uses of the term have arisen. This ambiguity and 
inconsistency has left the concept ripe for manipulation by 
justices desiring a particular outcome in cases in which the 
concept plays a role. This potential for partisan harm can be 
mitigated if the Court adopts a more precise meaning of 
“hostility to religion” as referring to only that which points 
out instances of active animosity to religion rather than as 
all that is viewed as simply non-neutral toward religion. 
